Scoring Methodology
Scoring Components
| Policy | Points | What counts | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| No iCasino apps | 40 | iCasino (online casino-style games) is not legal. |
Casino-style games are continuous, rapid-cycle products with structural features linked to higher addictive risk. This is weighted heavily because it removes the highest-risk online product.
|
| No sports betting apps | 30 | Online sports betting is not legal. |
Always-on sports betting increases accessibility and frequency, which raises participation and financial harms. This earns substantial points because it prevents 24/7 app-based exposure.
|
| No sports betting apps and no iCasino apps | 25 | Neither online sports betting nor iCasino apps are legal. |
Avoids substitution across products and keeps online gambling from becoming always-on and frictionless. This is the strongest exposure reduction.
|
| Mandatory loss limits | 20 | Mandatory, enforceable, cross-operator loss limits that cap how much a person can lose in a time period (e.g., monthly). Highly effective for preventing bankruptcies. |
Mandatory, enforceable loss limits are among the strongest interventions: they reduce expenditure and prevent rapid loss spirals. Consensus reviews rate these as high-impact, so this earns the most points.
|
| Mandatory operator intervention / duty of care | 15 | Requires operators to stop offering bets when users exhibit defined high-risk patterns (not merely provide links to a hotline). |
Real-time operator interventions (pop-ups, pauses, personalized feedback) can interrupt risky play. Consensus studies rate enforced interventions as high impact, so this earns high points.
|
| Ban on in-game betting | 10 | Prohibits in-game/live betting so wagers can only be placed before events begin. |
In-play betting compresses decision cycles and expands betting opportunities during events, which is linked to higher gambling risk. A full ban removes the highest-frequency sports-betting mode.
|
| Not allowed in app stores (web only) | 10 | Removes gambling apps from app stores, where the easy access and notification systems increase addictive patterns. In states with legal online gambling, these services would remain available on websites. |
Limiting app-store distribution adds friction and reduces impulsive access, consistent with public health approaches that reduce availability. This is structural, so it earns higher points.
|
| Close the Kalshi “investment contract” loophole | 8 | State action to block sports event contracts marketed as federally regulated derivatives. Joining the 36-state attorney general coalition earns 2 points; cease-and-desist earns 4; court action earns 8 (max 8). |
States can challenge sports-event contracts by treating them as sports wagering and forcing the preemption fight. Joining the multistate attorney general coalition is a low-intensity step, while cease-and-desist letters and court actions are more likely to be effective.
|
| Inducement / promo restrictions | 8 | Bans or tightly limits promotional inducements (bonuses, risk-free bets, boosted odds) used to accelerate losses. |
Bonuses, boosted odds, and risk-free bets increase engagement and risk-taking. Evidence reviews support restricting inducements, so this earns mid-high points.
|
| Deposit-to-bet waiting period | 6 | Imposes a mandatory waiting period between deposits and wagering to reduce compulsive 'tilt' behavior. |
Time-outs and enforced delays reduce session length and impulsive escalation. This is helpful but not as strong as hard loss limits.
|
| Credit card funding ban | 5 | Bans using credit cards to fund online betting. |
Credit cards enable gambling on borrowed money and accelerate debt-related harm. Bans reduce credit-fueled losses, but this is narrower than structural loss limits and some large betting services already disallow credit cards, so the points are modest.
|
| Default deposit/loss limits at signup | 5 | Requires players to set limits at signup (or imposes defaults) rather than burying optional limit-setting tools. |
Limit setting reduces spending, and requiring defaults at signup increases adoption compared with optional tools. This is meaningful but less protective than mandatory loss caps.
|
| Higher minimum age (25+) | 5 | Raises the minimum age above 21 (e.g., 25) for high-risk online gambling products. |
Younger adults show higher vulnerability and problem-gambling risk; higher minimum ages reduce exposure for the highest-risk cohort, so it earns moderate points.
|
| Spousal consent for joint accounts | 5 | Requires explicit spousal consent before connecting or using a shared/joint bank account for gambling. |
Gambling harms extend to families and shared finances. Requiring consent protects household assets from rapid losses.
|
| Strong advertising protections | 5 | Imposes meaningful limits on gambling advertising (e.g., time/place bans, tobacco-style warnings) beyond generic 'gamble responsibly' language. |
Advertising exposure increases gambling participation and normalization. Evidence suggests stronger ad restrictions can reduce harm, so this earns mid-range points.
|
| Public transparency & harm metrics | 4 | Requires public reporting on operator harm indicators (e.g., share of revenue from high-risk users, intervention rates), enabling oversight. |
Public reporting enables oversight of harm indicators and evaluation of policy effectiveness, a core public health approach. This supports enforcement and accountability, so it earns modest points.
|
| Tax Level | 4 | Higher online gambling tax rates earn more points. |
Gambling demand is price-sensitive and marketing-sensitive; higher tax rates that increase the effective price and reduce marketing spend can reduce overall gambling participation.
|
| Funding for problem gambling messaging | 2 | Earmarks funds for problem gambling education/public-awareness messaging (not just voluntary operator messaging). This is typically small and often poorly executed. |
Public-awareness messaging can help, but evidence shows most responsible-gambling campaigns have limited impact on behavior, so points are low.
|
| Non-integrated Self-exclusion list | 2 | State provides a self-exclusion program (ideally centralized across licensed operators). This is a low-efficacy tool when not integrated into the gambling user flow. |
Self-exclusion helps some users but is underused and often circumvented. Reviews show modest benefits when not integrated into gambling flow, so it receives low points.
|
| Problem gambling hotline | 2 | Publicly advertised problem-gambling hotline/helpline (and referral to support resources). This is a low-efficacy intervention. |
Helplines provide referral and crisis support but are reactive and reach a small share of harmed users, so the impact is limited and the points are low.
|
| State-run promotion/advertising of online gambling | -8 | State actively promotes online gambling (e.g., state-run ads or official promotional campaigns). |
State-run promotion normalizes gambling and increases uptake. Evidence suggests advertising restrictions can reduce gambling-related harm, so active promotion earns a penalty.
|
Scoring Calculation
Score starts at 0, then adds/subtracts components.
score = restrictionPoints + protectionsPoints + taxPoints − promotionPenalty
Tax Level
Higher tax rates reduce operator expansion incentives and ad budgets. We award:
taxPoints = ceil(onlineTaxRate% / 20), capped at 4
Awarded as ceil(onlineTaxRate% / 20), capped at 4. 10% yields 1 point and 80%+ yields 4 points.
Full table: tax rates by state.